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Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy /

by Sechser, Todd S; Fuhrmann, Matthew.
Type: materialTypeLabelBookPublisher: Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2017Description: xiii, 333 pages : illustrations ; 23 cm.ISBN: 9781107106949; 110710694X; 9781107514515; 1107514517.Subject(s): Nuclear warfare | Military policy | Diplomacy | International relations | United States -- Foreign relations | This contribution to Bissell Library was made by the George B. Zotiades Memorial Fund
Contents:
Part I. The logic of nuclear skepticism. Nuclear blackmail in international politics -- Nuclear coercion and nuclear skepticism -- Part II. Trends. Standoffs : nuclear weapons in crisis bargaining -- Stalemates : territorial disputes and nuclear politics -- Part III. Cases. Brinkmanship busts : when nuclear coercion fails -- Think again : reassessing nuclear victories -- Part IV. Conclusions. Nuclear coercion in myth and reality -- Appendix : methods and data.
Summary: Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence, but an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to give up possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries? The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book argues that this view is badly misguided and that nuclear weapons are useful for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion--Adapted from page i.
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Non Fiction 355.0217 SEC (Browse shelf) Available

Includes bibliographical references (pages 290-317) and index.

Part I. The logic of nuclear skepticism. Nuclear blackmail in international politics -- Nuclear coercion and nuclear skepticism -- Part II. Trends. Standoffs : nuclear weapons in crisis bargaining -- Stalemates : territorial disputes and nuclear politics -- Part III. Cases. Brinkmanship busts : when nuclear coercion fails -- Think again : reassessing nuclear victories -- Part IV. Conclusions. Nuclear coercion in myth and reality -- Appendix : methods and data.

Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence, but an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to give up possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries? The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book argues that this view is badly misguided and that nuclear weapons are useful for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion--Adapted from page i.

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